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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Richard David Pokorney appeals from his convictions for lewd conduct. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
After a trial at which he represented himself, Pokorney was convicted of 
five counts of lewd conduct with three of his five sons, but his conviction was 
overturned on appeal. State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 235 P.3d 409 (Ct. App. 
2010). While the matter was on appeal Pokorney moved to substitute the State 
Appellate Public Defender for allegedly failing to communicate with him, failing to 
procure transcripts Pokorney requested, failing to conduct discovery, and failing 
to contend to the appellate court that Pokorney's conviction was a result of a 
conspiracy between the prosecutor and public defender. (R., pp. 15-18.) The 
district court denied the motion on the basis that any motion to substitute counsel 
in the middle of an appeal should be made to the Idaho Supreme Court. (R., p. 
15.) 
Pokorney made another motion to substitute appellate counsel the next 
month, also denied by the trial court. (R., pp. 20-21.) 
After the Idaho Court of Appeals had issued its decision in the case, but 
before the remittitur issued, the trial court held a "Review Hearing after Appeal" 
and re-appointed the public defender to represent Pokorney on remand. (R., pp. 
25-26; 6/3/10 Tr., p. 5, L. 16 - p. 6, L. 6; Docket 34945 Remittitur.) 
Thereafter Pokorney moved for "conflict counsel." (R., pp. 49-50; 8/12/10 
Tr., p. 8, Ls. 14-15.) Pokorney claimed the conflict was, "obviously, ineffective 
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counsel, obstruction, denial of evidence, willful sabotage, on and on." (8/12/10 
Tr., p. 8, Ls. 18-20.) Pokorney specified that he wanted "a conflict attorney 
outside of - [the J public defender's office." (8/12/10 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 23-24.) The trial 
court instructed Pokorney to write a "letter and outline all of the concerns or 
problems you have ... and ... we will give you a hearing on it." (8/12/10 Tr., p. 9, 
Ls. 2-11.) The court then set a hearing date eight days later. (8/12/10 Tr., p. 11, 
Ls. 1-18.) 
At the hearing the court inquired why Pokorney had not filed a letter. 
(8/20/10 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 4-12.) Pokorney represented he had the letter, but when 
the court asked to see it Pokorney stated, "I withdraw that. I would like to just 
assert my right to go on pro bono, or pro se." (8/20/10 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 13-25.) 
Pokorney then challenged the initial appointment of counsel. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 13, 
L. 25 - p. 14, L. 11.) The court engaged in a colloquy with Pokorney that 
established Pokorney was without funds to hire his own attorney but wished to 
proceed with representation. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 14, L. 12- p. 15, L. 10.) 
In response to the court's questioning Pokorney clarified that he believed 
there was a conflict with appointed counsel, Edward Odessey. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 
15, Ls. 11-14.) The court asked Mr. Odessey if there was a conflict "in terms of 
[his] ability to represent Mr. Pokorney as a zealous advocate on his behalf." 
(8/20/10 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 16-20.) Mr. Odessey responded, "None at all, Your 
Honor." (8/20/10 Tr., p. 16, L. 21.) The court then established through counsel 
that discovery had been conducted, the case investigated, and that the Court of 
Appeals had ultimately reversed the conviction by overruling the trial court's 
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rejection of an objection Mr. Odessey made. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 16, L. 22 - p. 17, L. 
11.) 
Pokorney responded by claiming that Mr. Odessey had "lied to [him], 
threatened [him]." (8/20/10 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 18-23.) Specifically, Pokorney 
claimed Mr. Odessey had threatened to "make sure that [he] spent the rest of 
[his] life in prison" if Pokorney continued a particular line of cross examination of 
one of the victims while representing himself in the first trial. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 18, 
Ls. 1-9.) When asked by the court if he had made such a threat Mr. Odessey 
stated he had not. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 10-13.) The next "threat" was making 
sure Pokorney had civilian clothes for the trial "eight months before trial and 
without any kind of investigation." (8/20/10 Tr., p. 18, L. 16 - p. 19, L. 17.) Mr. 
Odessey represented that was merely part of trial preparation. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 
19, Ls. 18-22.) 
Mr. Pokorney laughed out loud in court at the idea that having civilian 
clothing for the trial was part of trial preparation instead of a threat. (8/20/10 Tr., 
p. 19, L. 23.) The trial court then expressed "grave concerns about [Pokorney's] 
grasp of reality at this point in time" and ordered a competency evaluation. 
(8/20/10 Tr., p. 20, L. 2 - p. 21, L. 11; R., pp. 60-61.) The competency 
evaluation, however, showed that Pokorney was not incompetent to proceed. 
(9/24/10 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 4-12.) 
In the meantime Pokorney submitted two letters, one dated August 17, 
2010 and the other September 20, 2010. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 6, L. 17 - p. 7, L. 2.) 
Mr. Odessey generally denied the allegations of inappropriate conduct or conflict 
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of interests in the letters. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 5-15.) The court found there was 
neither ineffective assistance of counsel nor a conflict of interest. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 
9, L. 16 - p. 11, L. 1.) The court then inquired if Pokorney wished to proceed 
without the services of appointed counsel and, when he indicated in the 
affirmative, discharged the public defender. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 11, L. 2 - p. 12, L. 5; 
see also p. 12, L. 8- p. 19. L. 23 (taking waiver of counsel).) 
The matter proceeded to trial (R., pp. 112-26, 133-51 ), at the conclusion of 
which the jury found Pokorney guilty of two counts of lewd conduct (R., pp. 195-
96). The district court entered judgment (R., pp. 370-72), from which Pokorney 
timely appealed (R., pp. 374-76). 
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ISSUES 
Pokorney states the issues on appeal as: 
I. 
WHETHER APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS VIOLA TED 
WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO APPOINT SUBSTITUTE 
COUNSEL RESULTING IN MR. POKORNEY PROCEEDING PRO 
SE, OR, IN THE LATERNATIVE, WHETHER THE COURT ERRED 
BY FAILING TO HOLD A SUFFICIENT HEARING 
II. 
WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPORT 
THE CONVICTIONS 
111. 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW 
MR. POKORNEY TO RECALL AND IMPEACH WITNESSES 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Pokorney failed to show any error in the district court's denial of his 
request for substitution of counsel? 
2. Has Pokorney failed to show that the evidence of his guilt is insufficient to 
support his convictions? 
3. Has Pokorney failed to show trial error in the district court's refusal to 
allow Pokorney to recall a state's witness in the state's case-in-chief to 
conduct further cross-examination? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Pokorney Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Denial Of His 
Request For Substitution Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Pokorney's request for substitution of counsel, 
finding no ineffective assistance of counsel and no conflict of interests. (9/24/10 
Tr., p. 9, L. 16 - p. 11, L. 1.) On appeal Pokorney claims that there was a conflict 
of interest "due to an irrevocable breakdown of communication between the 
attorney and the defendant." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Pokorney never claimed 
such a breakdown before the trial court, however, and his factual assertions to 
the trial court do not support any finding of such a breakdown. Pokorney next 
complains that the trial court "deprived Mr. Pokorney of his full and fair 
opportunity to present his complaints" about why substitute counsel should be 
appointed. (Appellant's brief, p. 17.) Review of the record shows the district 
court granted more than ample opportunity for Pokorney to assert his grounds for 
wanting substitute counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to appoint substitute counsel for an indigent 
defendant lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. I.C. § 19-856; State 
v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-715, 52 P.3d 857, 859-860 (2002); State v. Olayton, 
100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980). Credibility of witnesses, the 
weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the 
6 
evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson 
v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Pokorney's Assertion That There Was An "Irrevocable Breakdown Of 
Communication" Is Unsupported By The Record 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 
of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel, though not the right to 
an appointed attorney of one's choice. State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1058, 772 
P.2d 263, 265 (Ct. App. 1989). While the Sixth Amendment guarantees counsel 
who "function[s] in the active role of an advocate," Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 
748, 751 (1967), it does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between an 
accused and his counsel, Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1983). 
A trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an 
indigent defendant for "good cause." I.C. § 19-856; State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 
896,897,606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711,713,946 
P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct. App. 1997). Mere lack of confidence in otherwise 
competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for substitute counsel in the 
absence of extraordinary circumstances. State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729, 
620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980); Peck, 130 Idaho at 713, 946 P.2d at 1353. Instead, 
"good cause" for the appointment of substitute counsel generally requires either 
"an actual conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown of 
communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust 
verdict." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 856, 866, 181 P.3d 512, 522-523 (Ct. App. 
2007) (citing Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991); McKee v. 
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Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2nd Cir. 1981); United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 
1250 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
On appeal Pokorney does not challenge the district court's findings that 
there was neither ineffective assistance nor an actual conflict of interests. 
Rather, he limits his claim of error to asserting that there was a total breakdown 
in communication and that the trial court failed to give him ample opportunity to 
present that claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-19.) Application of the law to the 
facts shown by the record, however, shows that Pokorney never asserted to the 
district court that there had been a breakdown of communication despite more 
than generous opportunities to do so. 
It is difficult for a defendant to show a "total breakdown in communication." 
See United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1025 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(recognizing the "defendant's burden" and holding that "without any evidence 
precluding the possibility of mere strategic disagreement or suggesting such a 
'total breakdown in communication,' we cannot say the district court abused its 
discretion in denying [the defendant's] motions"); United States v. Doe, 272 F.3d 
116, 122-126 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that a total breakdown in communication 
had not occurred when the defendant made threats of physical violence to his 
counsel and his counsel's family, and when he alleged that his defense counsel 
had repeatedly lied to him, because while the rift between defendant and counsel 
was "at times intense," defense counsel was able to carry out his duties and 
some communication did take place); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1276-
1277 (9th Cir. 1998) (substitution of counsel not warranted where record showed 
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counsel and defendant communicated, although defendant complained about 
inadequate time meeting with counsel and counsel's "gloomy predictions"). A 
defendant may not "manufacture good cause by abusive or uncooperative 
behavior." State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, _, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 
2012). 
Factors in evaluating the "constitutional implications of a total breakdown 
in communications include" (1) the timing of the motion, (2) the adequacy of the 
trial court's inquiry, (3) whether the conflict between counsel and his client was 
"so great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate 
defense," and (4) whether the defendant "substantially and unreasonably 
contributed" to the breakdown. Lippert, 152 Idaho at_, 276 P.3d at 759. 
Pokorney's appellate argument notwithstanding, in this case there was no 
"total breakdown in communications." In fact, Pokorney never claimed any 
breakdown in communications. Pokorney did claim his attorney was an 
"arrogant, obstructive, colluding, prosecutorial sycophant" and accused him of 
"willful malefic behavior." (8/17/10 Letter, p. 1.) He listed many things he 
believed his attorney should have done differently in relation to the first trial. (Id. 
at pp. 1-2; 9/20/10 Letter, pp. 4-5.) He called his attorney a liar and "long-
winded, puffed up and lame." (8/17/10 Letter, pp. 3-4.) He accused him of being 
"on the heels and at the service of the prosecutor and judge ... a turncoat of the 
most despicable kind." (Id. at p. 4.) He went on at length about his theories of 
the case and accused his counsel of "abetting" the victims' false testimony. (Id. 
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at 5-6; 9/20/10 Letter, pp. 5-9.) He asserted he could not "trust" his counsel "or, 
by extension, the Ada County Public Defender's Office." (8/17/10 Letter, p. 7.) 
At the hearings Pokorney claimed the reason he wished substitution of 
counsel was "ineffective counsel, obstruction, denial of evidence, willful 
sabotage, on and on." (8/12/10 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 18-20.) Pokorney claimed counsel 
had lied to him and threatened him, giving such examples as pointing out that he 
could spend the rest of his life in prison and procuring civilian clothes for the trial. 
(8/20/10 Tr., p. 17, L. 18-p. 20, L. 1.) 
Tellingly absent from all of Pokorney's allegations is any claim that his 
counsel was not communicating with him. (See also Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16 
(detailing Pokorney's allegations without mentioning lack of communication).) 
Because there was no claim of a total breakdown in communication to the trial 
court, Pokorney has failed to show that the district court erred in not finding one. 
Applying the four factors set forth in the law also shows no grounds for 
substitution of counsel. (1) Pokorney did timely assert his claim for substitution 
of counsel, but at no time prior to the appeal did he claim a breakdown in 
communications. (2) As will be more thoroughly addressed below, the trial court 
gave Pokorney ample opportunity to assert his grounds for desiring a substitution 
of counsel. (3) Although Pokorney made several claims of why he did not have 
confidence in his counsel's ability to secure him a fair trial, lack of communication 
was not among them. (4) To the extent there was any breakdown in 
commun_ication, Pokorney's conduct was the sole cause. These factors show no 
good cause for substitution of counsel. 
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Finally, Pokorney bases a large part of his appellate argument on the 
district court's later comment that "taking every bit [of Pokorney's letters] as true, 
I cannot find there is a basis to remove Mr. Odessey." (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-
16; 9/24/10 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 17-20.) This statement is, at best, an alternative 
ground for denying the motion. Pokorney does not challenge the primary 
grounds for denying the motion; the district court's findings that "Mr. Odessey 
does not have a conflict in representing Mr. Pokorney in future proceedings" and 
that counsel had been effective when representing Pokorney in prior proceedings 
in the case. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 9, L. 16 - p. 11, L. 1.) Because those findings are 
unchallenged on appeal, and because the record does not support any claim of a 
"total breakdown in communications," Pokorney has failed to show an abuse of 
discretion in the denial of his request for substitution of counsel. 
D. The District Court Gave Pokorney A Full And Fair Opportunity To 
Establish The Bases For His Request For Substitution Of Counsel 
The trial court must afford the defendant a full and far opportunity to 
present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel. 
State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898, 606 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980). Review of 
the record shows that the district court fully complied with this requirement. 
When Pokorney initially raised the issue the district court instructed him to 
write out his reasons and submit them to the court. (R., pp. 49-50; 8/12/1 O Tr., p. 
8, Ls. 14-24; p. 9, Ls. 2-11.) Thereafter the district court considered two letters 
by Pokorney and held two hearings on the request. (See generally 8/20/10 Tr.; 
9/24/10 Tr.; 8/17/10 letter; 9/20/10 letter.) Soliciting written statements and 
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holding two hearings on the issue was more than enough for the district court to 
be made aware of the nature and merit of Pokorney's claims. 
Pokorney claims the court erred by not granting him an opportunity to 
"discuss" his written allegations. (Appellant's brief, p. 16.) The court did invite 
him to present any "additional allegations" not in the letters. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 8, L. 
22 - p. 9, L. 4.) Pokorney has cited no legal authority for the proposition that a 
defendant must be given a chance to "discuss" detailed factual allegations 
provided to the court in writing and has asserted no argument that his letters 
were deficient in conveying the substance of his claims to the court. He has 
therefore failed to show any abuse of discretion by the district court. 
II. 
The Evidence Was Sufficient To Support The Convictions 
A. Introduction 
Pokorney claims the evidence at his trial was insufficient to show sexual 
intent. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-27.) Sexual intent was, however, a proper 
inference drawn by the jury from the evidence in this case. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review, 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the finder of fact as to the 
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credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P .2d at 
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). Moreover, the 
facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of 
upholding the verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho 
at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
C. The Evidence Was Sufficient To Create The Inference Of Sexual Intent 
Lewd conduct consists of any lewd or lascivious act upon the body of a 
child "done with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or 
passions or sexual desires" of the defendant, the victim or a third party. I.C. § 
18-1508. It is well established that a jury may infer intent from the doing of the 
proscribed act. State v. Warden, 100 Idaho 21, 24, 592 P.2d 836, 839 (1979); 
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 384, 195 P.3d 737, 743 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
Marsh, 141 Idaho 862,867, 119 P.3d 637,642 (Ct. App. 2004). 
The information charged Pokorney with having genital to genital contact 
with R.P. (Count II) and manual to genital contact with W.P. (Count V). (#34945 
R., pp. 8-10.) R.P. testified that Pokorney rubbed his erect penis on R.P.'s 
genitals. (Trial Tr., p. 189, L. 15 - p. 193, L. 15.) W.P. testified that Pokorney 
fondled W.P.'s testicles and penis with his hands. (Trial Tr., p. 211, L. 21 - p. 
221, L. 15.) This evidence supports the reasonable inference that the touching 
was with sexual intent, and this Court cannot substitute its own inferences for 
those necessarily drawn by the jury. 
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111. 
Pokorney Has Failed To Show Trial Error In The District Court's Denial Of A 
Request To Recall A State's Witness During The State's Case-In-Chief For 
Further Cross-Examination 
A. Introduction 
At the conclusion of Pokorney's cross-examination of R.P., Pokorney 
indicated a desire to "recall [him] tomorrow." (Trial Tr., p. 202, Ls. 23-24.) The 
trial court indicated it would "take it up accordingly" and that it would "make a 
determination" whether to excuse the witness. (Trial Tr., p. 202, L. 25 - p. 203, L. 
7.) The district court also stated, however, "If you wish to call him in your case in 
chief tomorrow, he'll be allowed to testify." (Trial Tr., p. 203, Ls. 6-9.) The next 
day, still during the state's case-in-chief, the district court informed Pokorney that 
it would not allow him to call R.P. back to the stand for impeachment purposes, 
but would allow greater "latitude" in relation to the older victims. (Trial Tr., p. 287, 
L. 7 - p. 291, L. 10.) The court made no ruling at that time on whether Pokorney 
could call any witness in his own case-in-chief. 
Later that day the state rested and Pokorney began the presentation of his 
defense case-in-chief. (Trial Tr., p. 479, Ls. 6-7; p. 481, Ls. 6-8.) After the first 
defense witness the trial court asked Pokorney if he had any other witnesses and 
the defense rested. (Trial Tr., p. 490, Ls. 3-5.) 
Pokorney contends the district court erred by not allowing him to recall a 
state's witness for further cross-examination during the state's case-in-chief 
because the district court applied a rule of civil procedure and because, he 
claims, the ruling deprived him of his right to confront his accusers and present a 
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complete defense. (Appellant's brief, p. 27.) This argument fails because the 
district court has general authority to control the order and presentation of 
witnesses in a criminal case as well as in a civil one and because Pokorney has 
failed to show any constitutional violation arising from the court's ruling. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). The 
constitutionality of the trial court's decision excluding evidence is also reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 814-15, 839 P.2d 1223, 
1228-29 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. Pokorney's Claim That The Trial Court Erred By Citing A Rule Of Civil 
Procedure Is Meritless 
Pokorney claims the district court erred by not allowing him to recall a 
state's witness for additional cross-examination during the state's case-in-chief 
because the district court relied upon a rule of civil procedure as its authority for 
controlling the order of presentation of witnesses. He does not claim, however, 
that the court lacks such authority in a criminal case, only that it cited the wrong 
rule. It is established in criminal cases that "[t]he order of presentation of 
witnesses is an administrative decision within the discretion of the trial court." 
State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 729, 979 P.2d 128, 131 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
I.R.E. 611 (a)). Because Pokorney has failed to establish that the district court 
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lacked the authority to control the order of presentation of witnesses in a criminal 
case, his claim of error is without merit. 
D. Pokorney Has Failed To Show That The District Court Violated His 
Constitutional Right To Present Evidence In His Own Defense 
A defendant has a general right, rooted in the Compulsory Process or 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, to offer testimony of witnesses, to compel their 
attendance, and to present the defendant's version of the facts. ~. 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967); State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 
236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009). This constitutional guarantee, however, does not 
afford a criminal defendant a right to present irrelevant evidence. Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 
1473 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718,722, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Ct. 
App. 2003); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 956-57, 231 P.3d 1047, 1053-54 (Ct. 
App. 2010). 
Even relevant evidence may be excluded in certain circumstances. State 
v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 814-15, 839 P.2d 1223, 1228-29 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Indeed, as explained by the United States Supreme Court, trial courts retain wide 
latitude under the rules of evidence to limit a criminal defendant's ability to 
present evidence. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987); State v. Perry. 139 
Idaho 520, 523, 81 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2003) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284, 302 (1973)) ("With the exercise of the defendant's right to present 
evidence, the rules of procedure and evidence must be complied with to assure 
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both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt or innocence."). For 
example, "trial judges retain wide latitude" to reasonably limit a criminal 
defendant's right to cross-examine a witness "based on concerns about, among 
others, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety or 
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
at 679. 
The determination of whether a defendant's rights have been violated by 
the exclusion of evidence at trial requires a two-part inquiry: 
First, the trial court must consider whether the evidence proffered is 
relevant. If it is not relevant, the defendant has no constitutional 
right to present it. If the evidence is relevant, the trial court must 
ask whether other legitimate interests outweigh the defendant's 
interest in presenting the evidence. . . . [B]ecause the trial courts 
have such broad discretion to determine whether prejudicial effect 
or other concerns outweigh the probative value of the evidence, a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right[s] will only [be held to have 
been] violated if [the appellate court] concludes that the trial court 
abused its discretion. 
Self, 139 Idaho at 722, 85 P.3d at 1121 (citing Peite, 122 Idaho at 814-15, 839 
P.2d at 1228-29). 
The record shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 
Pokorney's only stated basis for wanting to recall the witness for further cross-
examination was that he "didn't have the material with [him]" when he cross-
examined the witness. (Trial Tr., p. 288, Ls. 18-19.) In denying the request the 
trial court concluded that did not justify allowing the victim "to be retraumatized 
again." (Trial Tr., p. 288, Ls. 20-21.) The court concluded its ruling stating: 
"[B]efore he's even recalled to the witness stand, you're going to outline to me 
what it is that you're going to ask him. And if it's about prior inconsistent 
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statements [by R.P.], who has been traumatized twice already, I am not going to 
give you the right to do that by recalling him. You had the opportunity to do that 
when he was on the witness stand in the first place." (Trial Tr., p. 290, L. 21 - p. 
291, L. 6.) 
The record supports the district court's analysis. Pokorney was given the 
opportunity to cross examine R.P. (Trial Tr., p. 197, L. 10 - p. 202, L. 22.) When 
Pokorney indicated that he wished to recall R.P. the court promised only that it 
would take that issue up at that time. (Trial Tr., p. 202, L. 23 - p. 203, L. 7.) The 
court did tell Pokorney that he could call R.P in his defense case. (Trial Tr., p. 
203, Ls. 7-9.) While it appears from the record that Pokorney may not have 
understood that calling R.P. in his own case-in-chief would not at that time allow 
him to cross-examine R.P. about his direct testimony (Trial Tr., p. 203, Ls. 4-11; 
p. 287, L. 22 - p. 291, L. 10), Pokorney cannot rely upon his ignorance of the 
proper procedure for cross-examination and direct examination to show error. 
See Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, _, 275 P.3d 857, 861 
(2012) ("Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those 
represented by an attorney."). Because Pokorney did have the opportunity for 
cross-examination, and his only excuse for not completing his cross-examination 
was that he did not "have the material" with him to conduct his cross-
examination, he has failed to show that the district court erred by denying his 
request to re-call R.P. during the state's case for additional cross-examination. 
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E. Any Error Was Harmless 
Even if the court erred, the error was harmless. "Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected .... " I.R.E. 103(a). See also I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded."). "The inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational 
jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the 
challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 
(2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The State has the burden of demonstrating that 
an objected-to, non-constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010). 
First, because the district court's ruling was limited to recalling R.P. (Trial 
Tr., p. 290, L. 18 - p. 291 L. 10 (disallowing recall of R.P but giving more 
"latitude" in relation to older victims), and because R.P. offered no testimony 
relevant to Count V (see Trial Tr., p. 185, L. 1 - p. 206, L. 19), any error was 
necessarily harmless in relation to the conviction on Count V. 
Second, the error was also harmless as to the conviction on Count II in 
which R.P was the victim. In order to establish error in relation to a court's 
decision to exclude evidence, the "substance of the evidence" must be "made 
known to the court by offer" or must be "apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked." I.RE. 103(a)(2). Thus, it is incumbent on the party 
offering evidence to present an offer of proof of the substance of the excluded 
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evidence to allow meaningful appellate review. State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 730 
P.2d 921 (1986); State v. Rauch, 144 Idaho 682, 685, 168 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Ct. 
App. 2007) (citing State v. Garza, 109 Idaho 40, 45, 704 P.2d 944, 949 (Ct. App. 
1985)). 
In this case Pokorney did assert he wished to inquire about "a whole 
bunch of stuff' based on some unknown "material" that Pokorney did not bring to 
his trial. (Trial Tr., p. 288, Ls. 18-19; p. 289, Ls. 10-11.) In response to the 
court's specific question, "What are you going to ask him about?" (Trial Tr., p. 
289, Ls. 11-12), however, Pokorney's only specific response was, 'Tm going to 
ask him about his statements that he had his clothes off' (Trial Tr., p. 290, Ls. 2-
4). Thus, Pokorney's offer of proof preserves only the claim that he was not 
allowed to impeach R.P. on his trial testimony that his clothes were off. 
R.P. did not testify that his clothes were off, however. He testified that he 
went to his parents' bed with clothes on but that his pants were "pulled down" 
when Pokorney rubbed his genitals on him. (Trial Tr., p. 195, L. 9 - p. 196, L. 3.) 
Because R.P. testified only that his pants were pulled down, not that his clothes 
were off, Pokorney's offer of proof simply mischaracterized R.P.'s testimony. 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that effective impeachment could be 
had in relation to this testimony. 
In sum, the only testimony Pokorney indicated he wished to impeach was 
R.P.'s testimony that he had his clothes off. R.P. never testified that he had his 
clothes off, however, only that his pants had been pulled down. Any attempt to 
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impeach on this point would not have resulted in an acquittal. Therefore the error 
was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2012. 
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